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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, auto insurance companies set personalized in-
surance rate based on data gathered directly from their cus-
tomers’ cars. In this paper, we show such a personalized
insurance mechanism – wildly adopted by many auto insur-
ance companies – is vulnerable to exploit. In particular,
we demonstrate that an adversary can leverage off-the-shelf
hardware to manipulate the data to the device that collects
drivers’ habits for insurance rate customization and obtain
a fraudulent insurance discount. In response to this type of
attack, we also propose a defense mechanism that escalates
the protection for insurers’ data collection. The main idea
of this mechanism is to augment the insurer’s data collection
device with the ability to gather unforgeable data acquired
from the physical world, and then leverage these data to
identify manipulated data points. Our defense mechanism
leveraged a statistical model built on unmanipulated data
and is robust to manipulation methods that are not foreseen
previously. We have implemented this defense mechanism
as a proof-of-concept prototype and tested its effectiveness
in the real world. Our evaluation shows that our defense
mechanism exhibits a false positive rate of 0.032 and a false
negative rate of 0.013.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→ Intrusion detection systems;
•Information systems → Enterprise applications;
Keywords
Telematics Device, Fraud Detection, Mixtures of Regression
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1. INTRODUCTION
Auto Insurers have long been known for pricing based
on customers’ evaluated driving risks. Historically, drivers’
risks were oftentimes determined simply based on age, gen-
der, model of the car and DMV records. With the recent
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development in personalization algorithms and auto telem-
atics, personalized pricing strategy in auto insurance indus-
try has evolved into a new era. Consumers’ insurance rate
now could be based on the actual driving data collected from
their vehicles.
Led by Progressive Corporation, many auto insurance com-
panies offer their customers a voluntary discount program,
in which a customer needs to connect a telematics device to
his car through an On-Board Diagnostic-2 (OBD-2) port.
This device records and sends driving data such as vehicle
speed and Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) to the insurers.
Using these data, insurers then calculate the dangerous driv-
ing behaviors of the vehicle operator (e.g., the frequency of
the hard brakes [8]), and analyze its measure to determine
if the operator is eligible for an insurance discount and the
depth of the discount. According to a new market research
report [12], the insurance telematics market size is expected
to grow from USD 857.2 Million in 2015 to USD 2.21 Bil-
lion in 2020, at a compound annual growth rate of 20.9%.
While there are obvious advantages in embracing personal-
ized auto insurance for both businesses and end customers,
there also comes a new form of attack, in which adversaries
can exploit the algorithms underlying insurance personaliza-
tion with the goal of obtaining a fraudulent outcome.
In this paper, we show that miscreants can use off-the-
shelf hardware to falsify the data to insurance telematics
devices, mislead insurance rate adjustment algorithms and
ultimately obtain financial profits to which they are not oth-
erwise entitled. Different from existing attacks against in-
surance telematics devices [10, 11, 27], one distinguishing
feature of our new attack is that it does not exploit any
vulnerability resided in the devices. Rather, it leverages
services’ own personalization mechanisms to alter insurers’
thought and decisions. As such, it indicates the current ap-
proaches to cyber security are ill-equipped to address the
vulnerabilities likely to exist in all personalized auto insur-
ance services.
Since people can engage with technology in non-deterministic
fashions, and there is no standard reference to authentic user
actions, the key challenge in counteracting the aforemen-
tioned attack is to distinguish if the data acquired from a
user represent his authentic actions or malicious manipula-
tion. To tackle the challenge, the paper further presents an
effective anomaly detection mechanism. The basic idea is to
verify the legitimacy of the input data to underlying person-
alization algorithms by using non-tamperable data acquired
from the physical world. More specifically, our detection
mechanism uses unforgeable acceleration measures to iden-
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tify the vehicle speed manipulated by miscreants.
We develop the aforementioned idea by first building a
proof-of-concept system prototype which emulates an insur-
ance telematics device with a newly added embedded ac-
celerometer. The system prototype contains two compo-
nents – an OBD-2 reader and a three-dimensional accelerom-
eter. The OBD-2 reader is used for gathering vehicle speed
from a cyber space – a car’s OBD computer – while the ac-
celerometer is for sensing vehicle acceleration from the phys-
ical world. Although our system prototype does not prevent
the physical access to the accelerometer and OBD-2 reader,
our work assumes the data acquired through accelerometer
are unforgeable for the simple reasons that auto insurers
can easily manufacture their insurance telematics devices
with an embedded accelerometer and protect it against the
physical access by armoring it in a self-destruct box [35].
Intuition might suggest our physical-space acceleration
measures should correlate with the variation in speed ac-
quired from the aforementioned cyber space. As a result,
an instinctive reaction would be to compute vehicle velocity
from acceleration measures, and then use it for insurance
rate customization. However, this is infeasible. First, in-
surance rate customization needs accurate velocity measure
and, in practice, existing techniques [52, 60, 45] do not pro-
vide adequate accuracy in velocity measurement. For exam-
ple, prior studies [49, 59] have indicated that the accelerometer-
based velocity estimation adopted in Inertial Navigation Sys-
tem (INS) suffers from integration drift – small errors in the
measurement of acceleration and angular velocity are inte-
grated into progressively larger errors in velocity1. Second,
a car’s onboard diagnostic computer can accurately mea-
sure the rate of vehicle speed using the rate of rotation of a
drive shaft, whereas an accelerometer is susceptible to noise
caused by poor road condition and engine vibrations etc. As
a result, the measures of speed variation – from cyber and
physical spaces – typically exhibit unobserved heterogeneity.
As part of our detection mechanism, we address the chal-
lenge of unobserved heterogeneity using a statistical model.
In particular, the statistical model follows the framework
of mixture regression models, which captures unmeasurable
noise in the physical world, and reflects the relationship be-
tween physical-space acceleration and the variation in speed
acquired from the cyber space. For each physical-space
measure, our statistical model outputs a predicted velocity
range. In detecting speed manipulation, we examine if the
speed variation measure from cyber space extends outside
our predicted velocity range. Once discovering the cyber-
space measure falls outside the predicted velocity range, our
detection mechanism flags the measure as an anomaly.
Our detection mechanism provides several advantages. Most
notably, it escalates protection for personalized insurance
program. With our detection mechanism, auto insurers can
identify the unlawful activities of their policyholders, and
prevent losses from fraud. In addition, our mechanism is
robust to previously unseen manipulation strategies. We do
not construct the underlying statistical model specific for
certain manipulation strategies. Rather, we use unmanipu-
lated data to model relationship between cyber-space speed
variations and physical-space acceleration, and then utilize
the model to evaluate the speed measures acquired from un-
1In [59], a quantitative study indicates that the average error
in position grows to over 150 meters after 60 seconds of
operations.
trustworthy cyber space.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions.
• We describe a generic attack against personalized car
insurance program that allows miscreants to alter their
unwanted driving behaviors and potentially obtain un-
lawful financial profits.
• We demonstrate the new attack against 7 different in-
surance telematics devices, disclose our findings to cor-
responding auto insurance providers and raise their at-
tention to the new security problem.
• We present a noise-resilient detection algorithm and
demonstrate how to use it to counteract the manipu-
lation of driving behaviors.
• We study the effectiveness of our detection algorithm
using a 1034-mile driving trace, and show our algo-
rithm achieves a false negative rate of 0.013 and a false
positive rate of 0.032.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
surveys related work. Section 3 describes and demonstrates
an attack against insurance telematics device. Section 4
presents the overview of our defense system. Section 5 shows
a proof-of-concept defense prototype that emulates an in-
surance telematics device with an accelerometer embedded.
Section 6 elaborates a statistical model that identifies the
manipulation of vehicle speed using the data gathered from
the defense prototype. In Section 7, we evaluate our de-
tection mechanism, followed by technical discussion in Sec-
tion 8. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 9.
2. RELATED WORK
There are three lines of work most closely related to ours
– cyber attacks in automotive contexts, intelligent trans-
portation system, and anomaly detection. In this section,
we discuss these work in turn.
Attacks in Automotive Contexts. In recent years, a
significant amount of research has been performed in the
context of automotive systems. Research in this domain
mainly focuses on two aspects – attacks against vehicle anti-
theft systems [29, 57] and attacks against auto OBD com-
puter [27, 36, 56, 44].
Attacks against vehicle anti-theft systems exploit the soft-
ware and hardware weakness of smart car keys. For exam-
ple, Verdult et al. reverse-engineered a passive RFID tag
embedded in electronic vehicle immobilizers and disclosed
the weakness in its design and implementation [57]. In an-
other research work, Francillon et al. analyzed the protocol
of immobilizers used in modern cars, and demonstrated an
adversary can enter and start a car by relaying messages
between the car and smart key [29].
Attacks against auto OBD computer target the internal
network of automotive systems. As all modern automobiles
rely on a broadcast network to connect the various compo-
nents of a car – including the engine, transmission, brakes,
airbags, lights, and locks – quite a bit of previous research
emphasizes on discovering and analyzing the security flaws
of the broadcast network. In [36, 18], Koscher et al. system-
atically analyzed the fragility of auto broadcast network. In
follow-on work [27, 26], Foster et al. demonstrated that an
attacker can compromise a telematics control unit, connect
to a vehicle and take the control of the vehicle remotely.
While our attack is performed in the same context, it is
significantly distinct. In terms of the goal of our attack,
an adversary aims to obtain a fraudulent insurance discount
rather than taking the control or gaining access to a vehicle.
From the technical perspective, the success of our attack
does not rely upon any vulnerabilities or flaws resided in
the software or hardware of an automotive system. In fact,
our attack only distorts or counterfeits the data gathered
from automotive systems.
Intelligent Transportation System. Intelligent trans-
portation system [5] aggregates sensory data from multiple
sources for different purposes, such as realtime traffic de-
lay prediction [55, 20], road and traffic condition monitor-
ing [45, 25], and driving behavior estimation [24, 19, 46],
etc. Among these applications, many use physical-world
data to predict specific events. To name a few, NeriCell [45]
uses sensing components on smartphones to detect potholes,
bumps, braking, and honking, and thus obtain a picture of
road surface quality as well as traffic conditions. Nericell ad-
dresses the problem of accelerometer re-orientation when the
phone’s orientation changes over time. Similarly, Pothole
Patrol [25] is designed to identify potholes using accelerom-
eter data. It avoids the re-orientation problem by mounting
the accelerometer at a known orientation. In our work, our
detection model does not rely on orientation. Specifically,
our model takes input from a 3-axis accelerometer, and pre-
dicts a velocity variation range in a direct manner.
Anomaly Detection. In terms of defense, our work re-
sembles anomaly detection which identifies patterns in data
that do not conform to an expected behavior. In the past
decades, anomaly detection has been studied in several re-
search communities across a large number of data domains,
including high-dimensional data [15], uncertain data [16],
streaming data [14, 13], network data [30, 33] and time se-
ries data [41]. Though the nature of the data in our applica-
tion fits the data type in time series, applying the techniques
developed for that data domain is not straightforward, for
the reason that the exact notion of an anomaly is differ-
ent for different application domains. For example, in the
stock market domain fluctuations in the stock value might
be normal while similar deviation in our application domain
is considered as an anomaly. In addition, the data in our
application contains a lot of noise that tends to be similar
to the actual anomalies. Consequently, anomaly detection
techniques that design specifically for other applications are
unlikely to be effective against our attack.
3. ATTACK AGAINST PERSONALIZED IN-
SURANCE
In this section, we show that insurance telematics devices
are vulnerable to a new class of attack in which an adversary
can manipulate the data sent to the devices with the goal
of obtaining a fraudulent discount from insurers’ personal-
ized insurance program. In particular, we first describe the
overview of insurance telematics devices followed by tech-
nical background relevant to the devices. Then, we reverse
engineer the devices and explore how they operate. Based
on the knowledge acquired through our reverse engineering,
we demonstrate potential attacks against insurers’ person-
alized insurance program. Last but not least, we discuss the
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Figure 1: The overview of an insurance telematics device.
cost of our attack and some ethical concerns.
3.1 Overview of Telematics Device
An insurance telematics device is typically used for mon-
itoring the driving habits of auto insurance policyholders.
It collects information about when a policyholder uses his
vehicle, how far he drives and whether he drives with sharp
braking. In addition, it collects the Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN). Using these information together, an insurer
calculates personalized insurance rates for its customers. In
general, policyholders who volunteer to install a telematics
device can get a markdown on their auto insurance of up
to 50% if they minimize hard braking, the time behind the
wheel and the number of minutes they spend driving during
higher risk hours [8, 6, 1, 9].
Typically, a telematics device runs a micro-kernel on an
embedded processor. Using a cellular modem embedded, it
communicates with an insurer’s data center and sends back
to the insurer the aforementioned information [17, 56]. The
telematics device physically connects to a car’s OBD-2 port
– SAE J1962 connector located under the driver’s side dash-
board – so that it can send specially formatted diagnostic
command messages over CAN bus, communicate with many
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) modules and monitor the ve-
hicle operation. To be eligible to an insurance discount, a
policyholder must plug in the device and drive with it. The
telematics device periodically pings an insurer’s data cen-
ter and ensures it is not physically disconnected. Figure 1
illustrates how a telematics device communicates with an
insurer’s data center and interacts with ECU modules built
into the car.
3.2 Technical Background
In this section, we describe the technical background of
ECU modules, CAN bus, and OBD-2.
3.2.1 ECU Modules
Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is a generic term for a
device that controls one or more electrical systems in a ve-
hicle. It is the “brain” of a motor vehicle that monitors
and controls vehicle operation such as brake, electronic fuel
injection and ignition timing etc. Some typical ECU mod-
ules include Brake Control Module (BCM), Transmission
Control Module (TCM) and Engine Control Module (ECM)
etc. As is shown in Figure 1, ECU modules can communi-
cate with each other through Controller Area Network (CAN
bus) without a central computer.
3.2.2 CAN Bus
CAN bus is a multi-master broadcast serial bus standard
designed to allow many ECU modules to communicate with
each other within a vehicle. When an ECU module sends a
message, every other ECU module on the bus receives it and
can choose to respond to it or ignore it. CAN defines the
structure and the way data are transferred between ECU
modules.
3.2.3 OBD-2
OBD-2 is a standard that specifies the type of diagnostic
connector and its pinout, the electrical signaling protocols
available, and the messaging format. An OBD-2 port is an
physical interface, through which an OBD-2 device (e.g., an
insurance telematics device) can access to various ECU mod-
ules and retrieve their statuses such as engine temperature
and engine speed etc. As is illustrated in Figure 1, an OBD-2
device sends specially formatted diagnostic command mes-
sages over the CAN bus. ECU modules on the network send
out the requested status information over CAN when asked.
To query vehicle speed, for example, a technician can en-
ter Parameter ID (PID) 0x0D into an OBD-2 device which
then sends the corresponding message over the CAN bus.
The ECU module that knows the vehicle speed returns the
vehicle speed.
3.3 Reverse Engineering
In order to launch an attack against insurers’ personal-
ized insurance program, we reverse engineer their telematics
devices2. We are interested in a number of questions: In
what condition, and at what frequency are information col-
lected? When does a telematics device start and end data
collection? Have insurers deployed and used any anomaly
detection mechanisms to prevent potentially malicious data
manipulation?
To answer the aforementioned questions, we built a testbed
that simulates vehicle ECU modules. The testbed allows us
to monitor the request messages of a telematics device over
the CAN bus so that we can better understand how the
device works and observe what information it collects. In
addition, the testbed allows us to control the response to
the request.
In establishing our testbed, we used a commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) hardware – ECUsim 2000 professional firmware
edition [3] – to simulate ECU modules built in a car. The
COTS hardware simulator provides physical connection to
OBD-2 devices through a standard SAE J1962 female con-
nector. Through an USB connection to the hardware simu-
lator, we can enable software control to it, monitor OBD-2
request messages over the CAN bus and control the response
to the request messages.
We connected 7 different insurance telematics devices to
the ECU simulator, and then used a C program to oper-
ate the simulator. In this setup, we passively monitored
the communication between the simulator and those devices,
but failed to observe any messages. To understand the root
cause, we inspected the electronic system of a motor vehicle
and compared it with that of our ECU simulator. In partic-
ular, we used an oscilloscope to observe the voltage changes
of the SAE J1962 female connector on both systems. Ac-
cording to CAN specification, we measured the change of
the electrical signal at PIN 6, PIN 14 and PIN 163.
2 There has been similar work from the security community
to cheat for 30% discount on insurance [42]. We figured it
out independently, made it more sophisticated, and designed
a kit to facilitate such attacks.
3A standard SAE J1962 connector contains 16 pinouts in
We observed the same patterns on voltage change from the
motor vehicle and our simulator when the car key is not be-
yond the ‘ignition on’ position. As the motor vehicle starts,
we found the vehicle system yields a voltage jump of 1 ∼ 2
volt at PIN 16, whereas we did not observe such a jump
from our simulator. Our hypothesis is that our simulator
does not emulate a car’s ignition and insurance telematics
devices start to request information from a motor vehicle
only when they detect such a voltage jump. Therefore, we
utilized an adjustable voltage power supply to power the
simulator. In particular, we tuned up the voltage volume at
PIN 16 from 12V to 13.3V. From our simulator, we observed
all the tested telematics devices start to request information
about vehicle operation after switching their operation volt-
age to 13.3V.
We set up our testbed with our ECU simulator and an
adjustable voltage power supply, and used it to understand
the workflows of telematics devices from 7 auto insurance
providers in the US. In particular, we used our testbed to
monitor the request messages from each telematics device,
and vary the response accordingly. In this work, we disclose
the workflows of these telematics devices in general.
We mark off the workflow of a telematics device into three
phases – engine ignition, engine in operation and engine
shut-off. Figure 2 illustrates the workflow of a telematics
device in each phase.
Engine Ignition. As is discussed above, the operation volt-
age of a telematics device is 13.3V. When detecting 13.3V,
the telematics device starts to request information about ve-
hicle operation including the speed and engine Revolutions
Per Minute (RPM). Using RPM, the telematics device deter-
mines if the ignition is on. In particular, when RPM reading
is above zero, the telematics device sets its internal state to
“ignition on”.
As is shown in Figure 2, every time upon its physical con-
tact with the car, the telematics device also requests Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN). This indicates that the insurer
might be aware of tampering if a policyholder attempts to
earn an unlawful discount by unplugging his telematics de-
vice right before a trip and plugging it back after the trip.
In addition to RPM, speed and VIN, we also surprisingly
found that some telematics devices attempt to access Diag-
nostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) of the motor vehicle, which in-
dicate the malfunctions within the vehicle. While the corre-
sponding insurers claim they calculate a discount only based
on a variety of factors related to driving activities, consid-
ering the malfunction information may be used a factor to
affect one’s insurance rate and the insurers fail to specify the
collection of such information in their privacy policy, we be-
lieve it is suspicious and inappropriate to collect malfunction
information within a car without a clear declaration.
Engine in Operation. Once the engine is started (i.e., the
operation voltage reaches 13.3V, and RPM and MAF read-
ings are above zero), the telematics device starts to query
vehicle speed repeatedly. In particular, the device sends the
vehicle speed request over the CAN bus once every second
presumably because most motor vehicles refresh their OBD
readings at about the same frequency. As the vehicle is mov-
ing, the telematics device also monitors abrupt decreases in
vehicle speed. More specifically, the telematics device beeps
which PIN6, PIN 14 and PIN 16 is defined as CAN-High
signal, CAN-Low signal and battery voltage (VCC) respec-
tively.
Standby 
Mode
Check 
VCC
Check Power 
Loss Query DTC
Query 
RPM&Speed Check RPM?13.3v No
<13.3v
Query VIN
Yes
0
Query SpeedNot 0 Check Speed Check VCC0
?13.3v
Not 0
Qeury MAF Query Speed&RPM<13.3v Check RPM
YesNot 0
0
Engine  Shut-offEngine In-operationEngine Ignition
Figure 2: The workflow of a telematics device in general.
if it discovers a change more than certain kilometers4 in con-
secutive speed readings.
Engine Shut-off. The telematics device stops querying ve-
hicle speed when its operation voltage drops below 13.3V.
However, it does not terminate completely. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, the telematics device instead checks the speed of the
engine and the mass of air flowing into the engine presum-
ably because some cars shut off their engines at stoplights
for fuel saving and emission reducing and the insurer does
not want to mistakenly count such engine restart as the be-
ginning of a new trip. In fact, the telematics device marks
the end of a trip only when its operation voltage is below
13.3V, and the readings of MAF and RPM are equal to zero.
Figure 3: An evidence showing the absence of anomaly de-
tection on the insurer’s server.
In addition to exploring the workflows of the insurance
telematics devices, we utilized our testbed to examine if in-
surers have already deployed any anomaly detection systems
to exclude obvious anomalies, e.g., extremely high vehicle
speed. In particular, we emulated a trip where our testbed
constantly responded telematics devices with a vehicle speed
of 157 miles per hour for about 80 minutes. Then, we ob-
served the trip through the aforementioned insurers’ web
interfaces. To our surprise, insurers involved in our exper-
iment all log and present our emulated trip on their web
interfaces (see Figure 3). As insurers log legitimate trips
and present corresponding information through their web
interfaces, the presentation of our emulated trip indicates
the absence of anomaly detection on insurer side.
3.4 Attack
As is discussed earlier, an insurer calculates a personal-
ized insurance rate for each policyholder based on the data
gathered from his telematics device, and the factors that
affect one’s insurance rate are publicly known [8, 1]. This
provides an unlawful customer with a possibility of altering
the data to his telematics device and obtaining a fraudulent
4Different insurers set different thresholds. For exam-
ple, Progressive considers velocity decrease of more than 7
mile/h in a second to be dangerous.
discount. Here, we propose two attacks against personal-
ized insurance program provided by 7 different insurers and
demonstrate both attacks could potentially allow an adver-
sary to earn an unlawful discount.
3.4.1 Offline Attack
Our first attack is an offline attack which roots in con-
ventional replay attacks. In particular, an adversary first
records a data trace representing safe driving activities. Then,
he replays the data trace to his telematics device. Since the
data trace represents safe driving activities, the adversary
can mislead an insurer into believing he is eligible to an in-
surance discount even though he is a high-risk driver.
To demonstrate this attack, we first developed a data col-
lection platform which allows us to obtain the driving in-
formation from a car’s OBD computer. The data collection
platform consists of two components: a bluetooth OBD-2
adapter physically connected to a car’s OBD-2 port, and
an Android phone that communicates with the car’s OBD
computer through the bluetooth adapter.
Using the data collection platform, we recorded a 10-mile
trip for 15 minutes. Then, we replayed the trip by respond-
ing telematics devices with corresponding data we collected.
In particular, we connected telematics devices to the testbed
we discussed in the previous section, and then used it to re-
spond those devices accordingly. We performed this replay
attack once every day in a week-long period. Through those
insurers’ web interfaces, we observed all insurers logged our
replayed trip for seven consecutive days. Again, this in-
dicates these insurers have not yet deployed any anomaly
detection system to identify obvious anomalies (i.e., exactly
the same driving activities shown to insurers for many days).
3.4.2 Online Attack
Despite effectiveness, the replay attack can be easily de-
tected. As the replay attack does not need to be carried out
in a moving vehicle – and some insurance telematics devices
have been designed with a GPS component – one instinctive
detection scheme is to use GPS to collect vehicle location
and examine if the car is in motion. In response to the
limitation of replay attacks, we propose another attack.
Our second attack is an online attack which manipulates
the data representing dangerous driving activities. Differ-
ent from the first attack, this attack is carried out on the
fly. In particular, we built a man-in-the-middle (MITM)
box which bridges a car’s OBD-2 port and a telematics de-
vice. Our MITM box monitors the response messages to a
telematics device. Once it detects a response message in-
dicating an abrupt decrease in vehicle speed, it will flatten
speed changes because a sudden drop in speed will be trans-
mitted back to insurers and has a negative impact upon the
Figure 4: The man-in-the-middle box that bridges a car’s
OBD-2 port and a telematics device.
policyholder’s discount. With the knowledge of the insurer’s
threshold that identifies a hard brake, our MITM box sim-
ply responds the highest value that is below the threshold.
Since our MITM box is installed inside a motor vehicle car-
rying out data manipulation while the vehicle is in motion,
this online attack is resistant to the aforementioned defense
which utilizes location information to identify the malicious
attack.
We implemented an MITM box prototype which consists
of three components: (1) an ELM327 adaptor that connects
a laptop and a car’s OBD-2 port, (2) a C program that mon-
itors response messages from a car’s OBD computer, and
manipulates them if necessary and (3) an ECUsim 2000 sim-
ulator that encodes forwarded OBD-2 readings (potentially
manipulated) into CAN message. Figure 4 shows how these
components are assembled. We installed our MITM box in
a 2014 Subaru Forester and experimented its effectiveness
in a trip. In our experiment, we intentionally pushed brake
pedal hard. However, we did not observe those telematics
devices capture such dangerous driving activities.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Cost
As is described above, we demonstrated our attacks using
off-the-shelf hardware (i.e., ECU Sim 2000 and ELM 327
cable). These hardware devices typically cost a couple of
hundred dollars. However, the investment in these devices
does not frighten miscreants off, especially considering the
long-term insurance discounts to which they are not other-
wise entitled. In addition, following Moore’s Law, we can
expect the fall in hardware price and thus the low cost of
our attack.
3.5.2 Ethical Concerns
In this work, our goal is not to obtain unlawful profits.
Rather, we expose the vulnerability resided in insurance
telematics devices. As such, we purchased a car insurance
coverage from 7 different insurers, enrolled our own vehicle
in a discount program and experimented our attacks in a
time window of three weeks. Before and after our 3-week
experiment, we did not plug the telematics devices to our
registered vehicle. Thus, this allows us to experiment at-
tacks without jeopardizing insurers’ business. Note that
once policyholders enroll in a discount program and have
their telematics devices plugged into the registered vehicle
for 30 days, insurers evaluate their driving behavior and ap-
ply their initial discount.
4. DEFENSE OVERVIEW
The aforementioned attacks exploit the fact that the auto
insurance discount program is lack of an effective mechanism
to check the integrity of the data acquired from end users.
Once a telematics device is handed out to the end users,
an insurer loses their control to the data collection. As a
result, unlawful customers can manipulate their telematics
devices in various ways with the goal of obtaining fraudulent
discounts. In other words, without an integrity check to
the data collected from users, the auto insurance discount
program is highly vulnerable to information manipulation.
In the past, many approaches have been designed to pro-
tect data integrity. Most notably, traditional computer sys-
tems utilize digital certificate to protect data integrity in
transit. However, such approaches cannot be easily applied
to many complex, highly-customized systems due to the dif-
ference in system design principle. Different from conven-
tional computer systems, an auto system for example is not
designed with a component to manage the risks to data avail-
ability, confidentiality and authenticity.
In fact, it is impractical to augment complicated and highly
customized system with the capacity of managing threats to
data. Again, take the auto system for example. From the
perspective of insurance companies, it would be unrealistic if
their data collection relies on a fundamental system change
to their customers’ motor vehicles.
In this work, we propose a new mechanism that can re-
duce auto insurers’ exposure to data integrity threats. This
new mechanism does not require any modification to auto
systems. The basic idea of this mechanism is to (1) on the
client side, extend telematics devices to collect unforgeable
data and (2) on the server side, augment insurers’ data cen-
ters with the ability to use the data to minimize the threat
to aforementioned data manipulation. More specifically, we
introduce a defense mechanism that contains two compo-
nents – a proof-of-concept system prototype that emulates
an insurance telematics device with a tamper-resistant ac-
celerometer, and an effective detection algorithm identifying
data manipulation on a remote server. The detail of our
defense mechanism is discussed in Section 5 and 6, which
describe the client and server side implementation respec-
tively.
4.1 Defense Mechanism Overview
As is mentioned above, our defense mechanism contains
two components. One component is for data collection and
the other is for manipulation detection.
The data collection component is equipped on a motor
vehicle. It gathers two types of data – vehicle speed ac-
quired from a car’s OBD computer and accelerations col-
lected through tamper-resistant physical sensors. The data
collection component periodically sends the collected data
back to a central server.
The manipulation detection component runs on the cen-
tral server. It processes the received data and then uses
a statistical model to identify the data potentially manip-
ulated. In particular, the manipulation detection compo-
nent processes unforgeable accelerations as well as the ve-
hicle speed which might be potentially manipulated. Using
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Figure 5: The trust model underlying the defense mecha-
nism.
a statistical model, the detection component takes the in-
put of accelerations and outputs a predicted velocity range.
The predicted velocity range represents a normal region. In
identifying potential manipulation, the detection component
examines if the speed variation derived from the consecutive
speed readings acquired from auto system lies in the normal
region.
4.2 Trust Model
Our defense mechanism assumes that the data acquired
from a car’s OBD computer is untrusted. As an insurer
itself is an honest party responsible for detecting poten-
tial fraud, our defense mechanism trusts the data collected
through sensors built in the telematics device. In addition,
our defense mechanism trusts the communication channel
between the telematics device and the insurer’s server. We
discuss the feasibility of our assumptions below.
Tamper-resistant Chip. To obtain unforgeable accel-
erations, an insurer can incorporate an accelerometer to
its telematics device and then safeguard the device against
physical attacks5. This can be achieved by protecting a
telematics device with tamper-resistant techniques [47]. For
example, an insurer can build its telematics devices using
sensor mesh that constantly monitors any interruption or
short-circuit on the chip [35]. Alternatively, ARM Trust-
Zone extension can be used to attest the integrity of the
sensors [39]. In fact, any device that conforms to Federal In-
formation Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2) [FIPS] Level
4 is required to provide a hard, opaque removal-resistant
coating with hardness and adhesion characteristics such that
attempting to peel or pry the coating will have a high prob-
ability of resulting in serious damage to the device.
Trusted Transmission. In transmitting data to the in-
surer’s server, a secure communication channel can be eas-
ily established. It has been disclosed in [56] that, since some
telematics devices transmit data through a 3G communi-
cation channel in plaintext using FTP protocol – and the
devices typically do not utilize any network authentication
mechanisms – an attacker could easily set up a faked cellular
phone base station and launch a man-in-the-middle attack.
Following careful implementation and design, these vulner-
abilities can be easily prevented. In our defense mechanism,
each telematics device should be embedded with a digital
certificate, and perform an SSL authentication each time a
communication channel is established.
5[56] demonstrates an attack that physically accesses to the
chipset on a Progressive’s Snapshot device and intrudes in
the on-board network of a vehicle.
4.3 Threat Model
The main goal of our defense mechanism is to detect the
sophisticated attack discussed in the previous section. In
fact, there are many other possible threats to insurance
telematics devices. First, an unlawful customer might equip
his telematics device into a low-risk driver’s vehicle. Sec-
ond, he/she could also connect his/her telematics device to
an equipment that supplies electronic power and responds
the device with data representing a car in parking status.
Lastly, he/she may unplug the device before his/her trip
and then plug it back after. Although these threats could
potentially cause economic loss for insurers, they are out of
our defense umbrella because they could be easily counter-
acted.
5. DEFENSE PROTOTYPE
Our prototype on the client side emulates an insurance
telematics device with an embedded accelerometer. It is
composed of an OBD-2 I2C adaptor [7], a microcontroller
board based on the ATmega2560 [2] and a GSM/GPRS
board [4].
The OBD-2 adaptor connects to the auto ODB-2 interface
and gathers speed readings of a vehicle through SAE J1962
connector. Using a built-in MEMS based accelerometer, it
also measures the acceleration of the vehicle. The micro-
controller board retrieves acceleration and speed readings
through the OBD-2 adaptor and temporarily logs them to
a microSD card. Through the GSM/GPRS board, the mi-
crocontroller sends the acceleration and speed readings to
a remote server, where our anomaly detection algorithm is
running to examine the legitimacy of the data.
6. DEFENSE ALGORITHM
In this section, we present a statistical model that can be
incorporated to the aforementioned defense mechanism and
counteracts the attack discussed in Section 3. As is discussed
in Section 4, the basic idea of our countermeasure is to use
tamper-resistant acceleration measures to evaluate the legit-
imacy of the speed data acquired through an OBD2 port.
Developing this idea, we introduce a statistical approach to
model the relationship between speed variation and acceler-
ation measure. Using this model, we then examine whether
a newly observed speed measure is manipulated.
Figure 6 illustrates three scatter plots, each of which indi-
cates the variation in vehicle speed against the acceleration
measure in each dimension. Since acceleration reflects the
change in speed, intuition suggests that the speed variation
and acceleration should follow a trend. In contrast, we ob-
serve that the acceleration measures in each dimension are
spread out across the speed variation, and there is no clear
trend between them. In statistics, this is called unobserved
heterogeneity which is typically contributed by unobservable
covariates (i.e., unmeasurable factors). For example, poor
road conditions can be an unmeasurable factor, resulting
in acceleration drift which contributes to the mismatch ob-
served in Figure 6.
As is discussed earlier, we need a model to capture the re-
lationship between the acceleration measure and speed vari-
ation (i.e., y = f(x) where x and y represent an acceleration
measure and a velocity variation respectively). Here, an
instinctive approach is to use a single regression model to
fit a function for both measures. However, a single regres-
Figure 6: The scatter plots of the speed variation against the acceleration measures in each dimension in Euclidean space.
sion approach typically suffers from the unobserved hetero-
geneity problem, and we do not want the aforementioned
unobserved heterogeneity to influence the regression model
accuracy. Therefore, we develop our statistical approach in
the framework of mixture regression models which typically
provide better control for unobserved heterogeneity.
In this section, we present how to model the speed varia-
tion and acceleration measure using mixture regression mod-
els. More specifically, we begin with the introduction to the
framework of finite mixtures of Gaussian regression models.
Then, we discuss how to use this framework to model the
relationship between the acceleration and speed variation.
Finally, we present how to perform manipulation detection
using our model.
6.1 Framework of Mixtures of Gaussian Re-
gression Models
Applications of mixture models have appeared in var-
ious fields including biomedical studies [37, 38, 21], eco-
nomics [34, 61] and marketing research [58, 48]. Within the
family of mixture models, the mixture of Gaussian regres-
sion models has the tight structure of a parametric model
and retains the flexibility of a nonparametric method. As
such, it provides better control for unobserved heterogene-
ity. In this work, we develop our statistical model in the
framework of the mixtures of Gaussian regression models.
Here, we describe this framework as follows.
Notationally, we say y depends on the vector of covariates
x in a mixture of J different ways if
y ∼
J∑
j=1
pijN(y|x′βj , σ2j ), (1)
where pi1, pi2, · · · , piJ are probabilities with a sum of 1. N(x′βj , σ2j )
denotes the density of a Gaussian distribution with mean
x′βj and variance σ2j . βj is the regression coefficient for the
jth covariate xj . All parameters {pi1:J , β1:J , σ21:J} construct
a parameter set denoted by Θ.
The aforementioned framework combines J distinct Gaus-
sian regression models, and each model is weighted by pa-
rameter pij . To use this framework to describe the relation-
ship between data, parameters {pi1:J , β1:J , σ21:J} need to be
estimated. In parameter estimation, the number of Gaus-
sian regression models needs to be determined. However,
this number is typically unknown in advance.
To address this problem, one typical approach [28, 53]
is to assign many possible values to J , fit multiple mix-
ture linear regression models and choose the model based
on Bayesian information criterion (BIC), Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC), Deviance information criterion (DIC),
or Bayes factor. However, such an approach is not computa-
tionally efficient and may cause under-fitting or over-fitting
problems.
In this work, we therefore use a Dirichlet Process (DP) [54,
22, 23] prior to relax the restriction of J and perform pa-
rameter estimation. The basic idea of this approach is to
relax J to infinity (i.e., J →∞). This is done by using DP
to define the parameter set Θ over an infinite dimensional
space, i.e., we allow an infinite number of parameters a pri-
ori, and posterior inference is done to select the number of
parameters, then draw the posterior of Θ, P (Θ|D), using
Gibbs sampler when conjugate priors are used. Note that D
in P (Θ|D) denotes the observed data. In the following, we
describe the detail of this approach.
Let a distribution G follows a DP with parameters α and
G0, denoted by G ∼ DP (α,G0). This means G is a (ran-
dom) distribution, and we can draw samples from G itself.
Here, G0 is a base distribution – which has a parametric
form – and acts as a prior distribution over components pa-
rameters {β1:∞, σ21:∞}. The concentration parameter, α, is
a positive scalar that controls the variance of the DP. As α
increases, G is more likely to be close to G0, i.e., G → G0.
Thus, α represents the degree of confidence in the base dis-
tribution, G0.
We use a “stick-breaking” approach [51] to explicitly con-
struct the DP. It is given as follows:
pij = uj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− uk), j = 1, 2, ...,∞,
{βj , σ2j } ∼ G0,
G =
∞∑
j=1
pijδ{βj ,σ2j }.
Then G ∼ DP (α,G0), where δ(βj ,σ2j ) is a point mass at
(βj , σ
2
j ), and {u}∞j=1 is a set of independent beta distributed
random variables such that uj ∼ B(1, α).
With the modeling of pij , βj and σ
2
j (j = 1, 2, ...) over
the infinite dimensional space, we can use Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) to draw their posterior P (Θ|D) and
estimate all the parameters in parameter set Θ. As our mod-
eling shares the principle of Bayesian inference in which the
priors are chosen to be conjugate, we particularly use Gibbs
sampling [32, 31] to draw samples of Θ from its posterior
distribution.
6.2 Modeling
With the knowledge of Gaussian mixture model described
above, we now define our problem with the following no-
tation. Consider a data set with n observed measures yi,
i = 1, ..., n, where each yi is an univariate value represent-
ing the variation in speed gathered through the OBD-2 port
of an automotive system. Corresponding to each observed
acceleration measure, we also have an unforgeable acceler-
ation measure xi, where each xi is a 3-dimensional vector
xi = (xi1, xi2, xi3)
′, representing an acceleration measure in
3-dimensional Euclidean space. As is discussed earlier, the
speed measures through a car’s OBD-2 port can be manip-
ulated. Therefore, our goal is to identify yi manipulated by
adversaries using xi.
Following the aforementioned Gaussian mixture model,
we model yi through xi, and then have
yi ∼
J→∞∑
j=1
pijN(yi|x′iβj , σ2j ), (2)
and
P (Θ|D) ∝ P (Θ) ·
n∏
i=1
J→∞∑
j=1
pijN(yi|x′iβj , σ2j ), (3)
with prior P (Θ) hierarchically defined as follows:
pi1 = u1, pij = (1− u1) · · · (1− uj−1)uj , 1 < j < J, (4)
uj |α ∼ B(1, α), j = 1, . . . , J − 1, (5)
α ∼ G(e, f), (6)
βj |σ2j ∼ N(µβ , σ2jVβ), (7)
σ2j ∼ IG(a, b), (8)
for pre-specified hyperparameters (e, f, µβ , Vβ , a, b). Here,
G(e, f) and IG(a, b) represent the density of a Gamma dis-
tribution and the density of an Inverse-Gamma distribution,
respectively.
In our problem, we note that posterior P (Θ|D) and prior
P (Θ) are conjugate distributions. Thus, we can draw P (Θ|D)
using a Gibbs sampler. In particular, we use a standard
strategy in Bayesian computation. It augments the param-
eter space of the statistical model through mixture com-
ponent indicators z1:n, i.e., zi = j indicates that yi was
generated from mixture component j, or yi|zi = j, xi ∼
N(yi|x′iβj , σ2j ), and with p(zi = j) = pij . Hence, we can
draw posterior and mixture component indicators jointly.
Considering drawing posterior P (Θ|D) is computationally
inefficient, especially when J approaches infinity, we finally
truncate J by setting its value to its upper bound. The
truncation exploits the fact that the number of components
in a mixture regression model cannot be greater than the
number of observed data (i.e., J ≤ n). The reason behind
this fact is that the construction of mixture regression mod-
els follows a process in which each observed data (yi, xi) is
assigned to one set of regression coefficients with the highest
posterior probability. In other words, each pair of measure
on acceleration and speed variation is mapped to one regres-
sion component in a Gaussian mixture regression model.
6.3 Detecting Manipulation
Now, we discuss how to use the aforementioned Gaussian
mixture model to identify fraudulent vehicle speed measures.
As is discussed in Section 3.4, we propose two manipula-
tion strategies – replaying driving activities of a safe vehicle
operator and altering dangerous driving behaviors on the fly.
In fact, adversaries could come up with numerous manipu-
lation strategies not foreseen previously. It is not practical
to use known manipulated data to construct mixture model
– and use it to identify potential manipulation – because we
cannot obtain an encompassing data set with all the data
manipulated through all possible strategies.
As a result, we perform detection as follow. The mixture
model takes an acceleration measure as an input and out-
puts a predicted velocity range. By examining if the speed
variation measured through a car’s OBD-2 port lies in the
range, we can determine if the speed measure is manipulated
or not.
In other words, given acceleration measure x∗i and vari-
ation in speed y∗ derived from two consecutive speed mea-
sures yi and yi−1 acquired through a car’s OBD-2 port, if y∗
falls in the predicted velocity range (ai, bi) derived from x
∗
i ,
we identify speed measure yi normal and unmanipulated.
Otherwise, we identify it manipulated. More specifically, we
compute interval (ai, bi) using the following formula:
p(y|x∗i , D) =
∫
p(y|x∗i ,Θ)p(Θ|D)dΘ (9)
≈ 1
S
S∑
s=1
{
J∑
j=1
pij,sN(y|x∗i ′βj,s, σ2j,s)}. (10)
Where D represents the data set that is used for model fit-
ting. Equation 9 is called the Bayesian predictive distribu-
tion. Equation 10 is a sampling based method for approxi-
mating the predictive distribution, where {pi1:J,s, β1:J,s, σ21:J,s}Ss=1
is a large set of samples obtained from the Gibbs sampler.
By generating a large set of samples from Equation 10, we
take a credible interval of the sample distribution as our
predicted velocity range (ai, bi).
7. EVALUATION
In this section, we test our detection system in the real
world. In particular, we evaluate the effectiveness of our de-
tection algorithm using a data set collected from real drivers.
7.1 Experimental Design
To evaluate the effectiveness of our detection system, we
design our experiment as follows. We recruited volunteer
drivers and separated them into two different groups. In
one group, we installed our detection system on cars and col-
lected information about driving habits. Note that in our
experiments, the data is collected from different car mod-
els. The only requirement is that we held our system in
the same orientation to gather accelerations in a consistent
setting6. In the other group, we plugged into cars our de-
tection system along with the aforementioned MITM box.
As is discussed in Section 3, the MITM box tampers abrupt
decrease in vehicle speed. Thus, the information acquired
from the second group contains manipulated measures on
6 In a real deployment, the insurance companies need to
keep distinct classifiers for each car model because different
car models have OBD-2 connectors in different orientations.
vehicle speed. We asked the second group of volunteers to
intentionally apply hard-brakes now and then to trigger the
manipulation of OBD-2 speed readings7.
7.2 Experiment Configuration
We conducted our experiment in the real world and con-
figured our system as follows.
7.2.1 Hardware Configuration
To collect driving information, we first configure our sys-
tem prototype. Motor vehicles from different manufacturers
update their ECU modules at different frequencies. While in
gathering driving information, if our system requests ECU
modules slowly, we may not be able to capture the subtle
change of vehicle operation (i.e., lose sensitivity). In con-
trast, if our system requests driving information at a high
frequency, it will increase the redundancy of driving informa-
tion. In our experiment, we balance sensitivity and redun-
dancy by empirically setting our system to request driving
information once every second.
Different from ECU modules built in cars, the accelerom-
eter of our system can be operated at a high frequency and
detect the subtle change of vehicle operation. In our exper-
iment, we set the accelerometer with a sample rate of 16.7
Hz.
7.2.2 Algorithm Configuration
We also configure the parameters needed for our detec-
tion algorithm. As is mentioned in Section 6, we generate
posterior from prior distributions. Here, we configure the
parameters used by the prior distributions. As we need the
prior distributions to be less informative, we set their pa-
rameters with e = 10, f = 1, m =< 0, 0, 0 >, λ = 5. We
initialize Gibbs sampler using our prior distributions and
run for a total of 30,000 iterations. Then, we use the last
15, 000 draws as the posterior distributions.
7.3 Dataset
In total, our detection system collects 89 trips that con-
stitute a set of raw data covering 1,034 miles across vehicles
from 6 manufacturers. Among the 89 trips, 40 trips contain
manipulated vehicle speed. The manipulation to the OBD-
2 speed reading is not triggered frequently – less than 1%
of all the collected data points are modified. Each record
in the raw data set contains vehicle speed measured from
a car’s onboard diagnostic computer and accelerations mea-
sured from accelerometers. An acceleration measure is a
tuple that contains three elements indicating the linear ac-
celeration in three orthogonal planes.
As is discussed earlier, our detection algorithm takes the
input of acceleration measures, outputs a predicted velocity
range and examines if the variation in consecutive speed
measures belongs to the interval. Therefore, we compute the
speed variation by taking the difference of two consecutive
measures on vehicle speed. In addition, we re-construct the
acceleration measures. As is mentioned above, our system
collects acceleration information at a high frequency while
gathering speed information at a relatively low rate. To
utilize acceleration measures to predict a speed variation, we
need one-to-one mapping from acceleration to vehicle speed.
In our experiment, we take the average of all its measures
7Volunteers only hit the brakes in suburban area where there
are less cars on the road.
Table 1: 10 most significant components con-
tributing the mixture regression model
i 1 2 3 4 5
pii 0.5020 0.0788 0.0780 0.0742 0.0568
i 6 7 8 9 10
pii 0.0423 0.0396 0.0370 0.0360 0.0331
in a time window of one second, and then use the average
measure to represent the acceleration at that time point.
In this way, we obtain a data set with 90,434 records, each
of which indicates a speed variation and the corresponding
accelerations at that time point.
As is mentioned above, we have two groups of volun-
teers who participate in our experiment in different settings.
Based on the source of the data acquired, we therefore split
our data records into two sets. In particular, our first set
contains 14,170 data records derived from the first group
of volunteer drivers, while the second comes from the other
group of volunteers. As the first data set does not contain
tampered vehicle speed, we use it to construct our detection
model. In contrast, the second set contains manipulated
vehicle speed, and thus we use it to evaluate our detection
model.
7.4 Results
Using the algorithm described in Section 6 and the data
set discussed above, we construct a mixture Gaussian regres-
sion model. In the following, we describe the characteristics
of the model followed by the evaluation of its effectiveness.
7.4.1 Characteristics
Our final mixture regression model contains 10“non-empty”
components, i.e., pii ≥ 10−5 with i ∈ [1, 2, · · ·10]. Table 1
shows the value of the weight across each component (i.e.,
pi1:10). As we observe from the table, our model consists
of one dominant and nine minor components because the
value of pi1 is significantly greater than the values of the
succeeding weights. This indicates that, the variation in ve-
hicle speed is mainly dominated by the accelerations of a
motor vehicle but at the same time largely influenced by
unmeasurable noise (e.g., the noise introduced by poor road
condition, engine vibrations and bad weather).
Taking a close look at each component – especially the
values of parameter β1:3 – we further examine the most and
least significant variables in our model. To illustrate, we take
the dominant component for example and plot the draws of
β1:3 in Figure 7. In this figure, the space between the red
lines represents a 95% credible interval. Using it, we can
easily assess both the practical and statistical significance
for a given covariate. In this particular case, we can say
variable x1 and x2 are significant because the central points
of β1 and β2 fall at 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. In addition,
both the credible intervals do not contain 0. In contrast, x3
is a least significant variable for the reason that the central
point of β3 is approximately zero. In our experiment, x1 and
x2 represent the accelerations in forward and lateral direc-
tions, whereas x3 indicates the acceleration in the direction
perpendicular to the ground. As such, variable x3 has nearly
no contribution to speed variation, whereas variable x1 and
x2 are more informative in predicting speed variation.
7.4.2 Effectiveness
Figure 9 plots a receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
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(a) Forward
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0 5000 10000 15000
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
Iterations
β 2
(b) Lateral
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Figure 7: The influence of the acceleration in each direction.
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Figure 8: Analysis of detection failures.
curve that illustrates the true positive rate against the false
positive rate at various threshold settings. Our detection
algorithm exhibits a false positive rate of 0.032 when the
false negative rate is equal to 0.013. This low false negative
indicates that our detection is highly precise in identifying
manipulated vehicle speed, and the low false positive demon-
strates that our detection algorithm is less likely to pinpoint
an unmanipulated speed as a manipulated one.
We also take a closer look at those small amounts of ma-
nipulated data points that our algorithm fails to detect. Fig-
ure 8a showcases a representative sample data trace indicat-
ing a hard brake before and after it gets manipulated. Our
detection algorithm can identify all the manipulated data
points except the one marked in the figure. Although our
algorithm fails to identify the last manipulated data point,
we observe that, the algorithm accurately marks the major-
ity of manipulated data points in this dangerous hard brake.
If we take this hard brake as an event, this false negative is
by no means our algorithm misses out speed manipulation.
As such a case is common in our data set, our algorithm can
successfully identify all hard brake events despite missed in-
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Figure 9: The ROC curve of our detection mechanism.
dividual data points.
Finally, we inspect those data points that our algorithm
mistakenly identifies as manipulated. In Figure 8b, we il-
lustrate a representative unmanipulated data trace in which
we highlight two data points that we mistakenly identify
as manipulated. Compared with those manipulated data
points identified precisely in Figure 8a, the mistakenly iden-
tified data points are spread out across time. This means we
can easily rule out the data points that our algorithm mis-
takenly identifies as manipulated (i.e., false positive). Simi-
lar to the showcase discussed above, such an observation is
common in our data set, and thus the false positives do not
incur misjudgment (i.e., identifying an innocent driver as a
miscreant).
8. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss some security and overhead
issues of the proposed defense mechanism. Then, we discuss
other defense options, their limitations and some related is-
sues concerning the aforementioned attack.
Issues Related to the Current Design. Our statisti-
cal model outputs a predicted velocity range. In detect-
ing speed manipulation, we examine if the speed variation
measure from the OBD-2 extends outside our predicted ve-
locity range. A sophisticated attacker could implement an
enhanced MITM box that manipulates the OBD-2 readings
based on the predicted velocity range. However, such attack
is infeasible considering the restricted computing capability
in the telematics devices.
In our design, the telematics devices additionally send av-
eraged accelerometer readings to the insurer’s server, which
may have impacts to both the computation and network
communication. Since the averaging algorithm mentioned in
Section 7.3 is extremely simple, the computation overhead
can be neglectable. In addition, the averaged acceleration
data is sent at 1HZ along with the OBD-2 readings, so the
network traffic is quadrupled (acceleration data has 3 axes).
Spatial Anomaly Detection. In addition to the afore-
mentioned defense mechanism, another defense option is to
detect manipulation using location information, which can
be obtain from GPS chips [40]. An insurer can use GPS
information to identify the motion of the car at a coarse
granularity, and catch fraudulent activities if a miscreant
simply replays a pre-recorded driving trace without making
his vehicle in motion.
However, the location based defense provides inadequate
reliability and accuracy. From a reliability standpoint, the
location information may not be always available. Since
the GPS receiver is dependent upon unobstructed view to
satellites, the location based detection fails when a vehicle
is moving along urban canyons (tall buildings and tunnels),
or a GPS device is unable to stay sufficiently close to the
window of a moving vehicle. From an accuracy standpoint,
current GPS-based solutions provide only modest accuracy.
GPS devices are positional speedometers based on how far
the device has moved since the last measurement. The speed
information is calculated based on formulas and is normal-
ized, so it is not an instant value [50]. Many GPS receivers
output data at 1Hz, as a result, fine-grain acceleration data
in this second is lost. This coarse-grain measurement is in-
effective for subtle manipulates of velocity readings. On the
contrary, using accelerometer, we can capture instant accel-
eration at a higher frequency (in our experiment, we used
16.7 HZ).
Driving Behavior Identification. Abnormal driving be-
havior monitoring is a technique developed to improve drivers’
awareness of their driving habits (e.g., [19, 46]). Using a
variety of sensors, such as accelerometer and gyroscope, it
identifies dangerous driving activities in a trip. In customiz-
ing insurance rate, insurers also identify dangerous driving
activities, particularly using the velocity readings acquired
from a telematics device. As such, intuition might suggest
that the driving behavior monitoring technique could be a
substitution to current telematics-based technique. Since
existing tamper-resilient techniques can safeguard sensors
and make sensor readings unforgeable [39], this substituted
solution can be another defense option. For example, AAA
Drive is an APP that is installed on a customer’s smart-
phone to monitor the driver’s driving behavior [43]. Simi-
lar to telematics-based techniques, good driving behavior is
the criterion for premium discount. In practice, this solu-
tion however is infeasible. First, smartphone-based monitor-
ing cannot stop a miscreant to refuse to log high-risk jour-
neys. Currently, insurer like AAA requires the customers to
maintain a minimal mileage each month to remain eligible
for the program. Second, insurers need to identify subtle
variations in vehicle speed to determine if a vehicle brakes
suddenly, whereas the driving behavior monitoring cannot
accurately distinguish information pertaining to movement
behavior from other factors that affect the sensor readings.
In particular, potholes and other severe road surface can
mask the relevant information.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a new attack against personal-
ized auto insurance services. It exploits the fact that person-
alized auto insurance services are lack of an effective mecha-
nism to verify the authenticity of the data that they collect
for personalized pricing. Launching this attack, a miscreant
can obtain unlawful financial profits. While the attack is
trivial, it can bring about significant negative impacts on
auto insurers, especially considering an increasing number
of auto insurers use personalized pricing to open up new av-
enues of growth. In response to the new attack, we also in-
troduce a defense mechanism which verifies data integrity by
utilizing unforgeable data acquired from the physical world.
Using trustworthy data acquired from the physical world,
we construct a sophisticated statistical model to counteract
the attack against personalized insurance pricing. As part of
future work, we plan to collaborate with auto insurers and
incorporate our defense mechanism into their personalized
auto insurance services.
10. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their
helpful feedback and our shepherd, Marco Zuniga, for his
valuable comments on revision of this paper. This work
is partially supported by U.S. Army Research Office under
Grant No. W911NF-13-1-0421 (MURI), by National Sci-
ence Foundation under Grants No. CNS-1505664 and by
Penn State Institute for Cyber Science Seed Funding Ini-
tiative grant. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Na-
tional Science Foundation and U.S. Army Research Office.
11. REFERENCES
[1] Allstate Drivewise Review.
https://www.expertinsurancereviews.com/
usage-based-insurance/allstate-drivewise/.
[2] Arduino MEGA 2560. https:
//www.arduino.cc/en/Main/ArduinoBoardMega2560.
[3] ECUsim 2000 OBD-II Simulator.
https://www.scantool.net/ecusim-2000.html.
[4] GSM/GPRS Board (Arduino UNO + SIM900 +
microSD + xBee).
http://freematics.com/store/index.php?route=
product/product&path=17&product id=67.
[5] Intelligent transportation system.
http://www.its.dot.gov/.
[6] Liberty Mutual RightTrack.
https://www.libertymutual.com/righttrack.
[7] OBDII I2C Adapter - Accelerometer and GYRO.
http://www.dfrobot.com/index.php?route=product/
product&product id=960#.VrFO-jYrJGx.
[8] Snapshot Terms & Conditions. https://www.
progressive.com/auto/snapshot-terms-conditions/.
[9] State Farm In-Drive. https://www.statefarm.com/
insurance/auto/discounts/drive-safe-save/indrive.
[10] A remote attack on an aftermarket telematics service,
2014. http://argus-sec.com/blog/
remote-attack-aftermarket-telematics-service/.
[11] Hacker Says Attacks On ’Insecure’ Progressive
Insurance Dongle In 2 Million US Cars Could Spawn
Road Carnage, 2015. http:
//www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/01/15/
researcher-says-progressive-insurance-dongle-totally-insecure/.
[12] Insurance Telematics Market by Deployment Type,
End User (Small and Medium Enterprises, and Large
Enterprises), and by Region (North America, Europe,
Asia-Pacific, Middle East and Africa, and Latin
America) - Global Forecast and Analysis to 2020,
2015. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
insurance-telematics-market-worth-221-billion-usd-by-2020-561817961.
html.
[13] C. C. Aggarwal. On abnormality detection in
spuriously populated data streams. In Proceedings of
the SIAM International Conference on Data Mining,
2005.
[14] C. C. Aggarwal and et al. Event detection in social
streams. In Proceedings of the SIAM International
Conference on Data Mining, 2012.
[15] C. C. Aggarwal and P. S. Yu. Outlier detection for
high dimensional data. In Proceedings of the 2001
ACM SIGMOD International Conference on
Management of Data, SIGMOD ’01, pages 37–46, New
York, NY, USA, 2001. ACM.
[16] C. C. Aggarwal and P. S. Yu. Outlier detection with
uncertain data. In Proceedings of the SIAM
International Conference on Data Mining, 2008.
[17] A. Bauer, K. Burns, M. Esposito, D. Huber, and
P. O’Malley. Monitoring system for determining and
communicating a cost of insurance, jan 2012.
http://www.google.com/patents/US8090598.
[18] S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor, D. Anderson,
H. Shacham, S. Savage, K. Koscher, A. Czeskis,
F. Roesner, and T. Kohno. Comprehensive
experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces.
In Proceedings of the 20th USENIX Conference on
Security, SEC’11, pages 6–6, Berkeley, CA, USA,
2011. USENIX Association.
[19] Z. Chen, J. Yu, Y. Zhu, Y. Chen, and M. Li. D3:
Abnormal driving behaviors detection and
identification using smartphone sensors. In Proceedings
of the 12th IEEE International Conference on
Sensing, Communication, and Networking, 2015.
[20] C. G. Claudel and A. M. Bayen. Guaranteed bounds
for traffic flow parameters estimation using mixed
lagrangian-eulerian sensing. In Communication,
Control, and Computing, 2008 46th Annual Allerton
Conference on, pages 636–645. IEEE, 2008.
[21] A. Cron, C. Gouttefangeas, J. Frelinger, L. Lin, S. K.
Singh, C. M. Britten, M. J. P. Welters, S. H. van der
Burg, M. West, and C. Chan. Hierarchical modeling
for rare event detection and cell subset alignment
across flow cytometry samples. PLoS Comput Biol,
9(7):e1003130, 07 2013.
[22] K. El-Arini. Dirichlet Processes: a Gentle Tutorial.
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/˜./kbe/dp tutorial.pdf.
[23] K. El-Arini. What is an intuitive explanation of
Dirichlet process clustering? https://www.quora.com/
What-is-an-intuitive-explanation-of-Dirichlet-process-clustering.
[24] H. Eren, S. Makinist, E. Akin, and A. Yilmaz.
Estimating driving behavior by a smartphone. In
Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV), 2012 IEEE,
pages 234–239. IEEE, 2012.
[25] J. Eriksson, L. Girod, B. Hull, R. Newton, S. Madden,
and H. Balakrishnan. The pothole patrol: using a
mobile sensor network for road surface monitoring. In
Proceedings of the 6th international conference on
Mobile systems, applications, and services, pages
29–39. ACM, 2008.
[26] I. Foster and K. Koscher. Exploring controller area
networks. In login. USENIX Association, 2015.
[27] I. Foster, A. Prudhomme, K. Koscher, and S. Savage.
Fast and vulnerable: A story of telematic failures. In
9th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies
(WOOT 15), Washington, D.C., Aug. 2015. USENIX
Association.
[28] C. Fraley and A. E. Raftery. How many clusters?
which clustering method? answers via model-based
cluster analysis. The Computer Journal,
41(8):578–588, 1998.
[29] A. Francillon, B. Danev, and S. Capkun. Relay
attacks on passive keyless entry and start systems in
modern cars. In Network and Distributed System
Security, 2011.
[30] J. Gao, F. Liang, W. Fan, C. Wang, Y. Sun, and
J. Han. On community outliers and their efficient
detection in information networks. In Proceedings of
the 16th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, KDD ’10,
pages 813–822, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[31] A. E. Gelfand and A. F. M. Smith. Sampling-based
approaches to calculating marginal densities. Journal
of the American Statistical Association,
85(410):398–409, 1990.
[32] S. Geman and D. Geman. Stochastic relaxation, gibbs
distributions, and the bayesian restoration of images.
IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine
Intelligence, 6(6):721–741, 1984.
[33] M. Gupta, J. Gao, Y. Sun, and J. Han. Integrating
community matching and outlier detection for mining
evolutionary community outliers. In Proceedings of the
18th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, KDD ’12,
pages 859–867, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[34] J. D. Hamilton. A New Approach to the Economic
Analysis of Nonstationary Time Series and the
Business Cycle. Econometrica, 57(2):357–84, March
1989.
[35] O. Ko¨mmerling and M. G. Kuhn. Design principles for
tamper-resistant smartcard processors. In USENIX
workshop on Smartcard Technology, volume 12, pages
9–20, 1999.
[36] K. Koscher, A. Czeskis, F. Roesner, S. Patel,
T. Kohno, S. Checkoway, D. McCoy, B. Kantor,
D. Anderson, H. Shacham, et al. Experimental
security analysis of a modern automobile. In Security
and Privacy (S&P), 2010 IEEE Symposium on, pages
447–462. IEEE, 2010.
[37] L. Lin, C. Chan, S. R. Hadrup, T. M. Froesig,
Q. Wang, and M. West. Hierarchical bayesian mixture
modelling for antigen-specific t-cell subtyping in
combinatorially encoded flow cytometry studies.
Statistical applications in genetics and molecular
biology, 12(3):309aˆA˘Tˇ331, June 2013.
[38] L. Lin, C. Chan, and M. West. Discriminative variable
subsets in bayesian classification with mixture models,
with application in flow cytometry studies.
Biostatistics, 2015.
[39] H. Liu, S. Saroiu, A. Wolman, and H. Raj. Software
abstractions for trusted sensors. In Proceedings of the
10th international conference on Mobile systems,
applications, and services, pages 365–378. ACM, 2012.
[40] C.-T. Lu, D. Chen, and Y. Kou. Algorithms for spatial
outlier detection. In Proceedings of the Third IEEE
International Conference on Data Mining, 2003.
[41] J. Ma and S. Perkins. Online novelty detection on
temporal sequences. In Proceedings of the Ninth ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining, KDD ’03, pages 613–618,
New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[42] meccanexus. Hacking the progressive snapshot obdii
device for perpetual 30discount on insurance. https:
//www.reddit.com/r/hacking/comments/2bjo0k/
hacking the progressive snapshot obdii device for.
[43] meccanexus. Meet aaadrive. https://chicago.aaa.com/
Insurance/AAADrive-Dashboard.aspx.
[44] C. Miller and C. Valasek. Adventures in automotive
networks and control units. In DEF CON 21 Hacking
Conference. Las Vegas, NV: DEF CON, 2013.
[45] P. Mohan, V. N. Padmanabhan, and R. Ramjee.
Nericell: Using mobile smartphones for rich
monitoring of road and traffic conditions. In
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Embedded
Network Sensor Systems, 2008.
[46] J. Paefgen, F. Kehr, Y. Zhai, and F. Michahelles.
Driving behavior analysis with smartphones: Insights
from a controlled field study. In Proceedings of the
11th International Conference on Mobile and
Ubiquitous Multimedia, 2012.
[47] S. Ravi, A. Raghunathan, and S. Chakradhar. Tamper
resistance mechanisms for secure embedded systems.
In VLSI Design, 2004. Proceedings. 17th International
Conference on, pages 605–611, 2004.
[48] I. S. C. Rick L. Andrews. A comparison of segment
retention criteria for finite mixture logit models.
Journal of Marketing Research, 40(2):235–243, 2003.
[49] D. Sachs. Google tech talk: Sensor fusion on android
devices: A revolution in motion processing, 2010.
[50] L. Serrano, D. Kim, and R. B. Langley. A single gps
receiver as a real-time, accurate velocity and
acceleration sensor. In Proceedings of the the 17th
International Technical Meeting of the Satellite
Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS
2004), Long Beach, CA, USA, volume 2124, 2004.
[51] J. Sethuraman. A constructive definition of dirichlet
priors. Statistica Sinica, 4:639–650, 1994.
[52] B. L. Smith, H. Zhang, M. Fontaine, and M. Green.
Cellphone probes as an atms tool, 2003.
[53] R. J. Steele and A. E. Raftery. Performance of
bayesian model selection criteria for gaussian mixture
models. In Frontiers of Statistical Decision Making
and Bayesian Analysis, (chap. 4.1):113–130, 2010.
[54] Y. W. Teh. Dirichlet process. In Encyclopedia of
machine learning, pages 280–287. Springer, 2011.
[55] A. Thiagarajan, L. Ravindranath, K. LaCurts,
S. Madden, H. Balakrishnan, S. Toledo, and
J. Eriksson. Vtrack: accurate, energy-aware road
traffic delay estimation using mobile phones. In
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Embedded
Networked Sensor Systems, pages 85–98. ACM, 2009.
[56] C. Thuen. Remote control automobiles. In the 3rd
Embeded Security in Cars (ESCAR) US, May 27-28
2015.
[57] R. Verdult, F. D. Garcia, and B. Ege. Dismantling
megamos crypto: Wirelessly lockpicking a vehicle
immobilizer. In Supplement to the 22nd USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 13), pages
703–718, Washington, D.C., 2015. USENIX
Association.
[58] G. J. R. Wagner A. Kamakura. A probabilistic choice
model for market segmentation and elasticity
structure. Journal of Marketing Research,
26(4):379–390, 1989.
[59] O. J. Woodman. An introduction to inertial
navigation, 2007.
[60] J. Yoon, B. Noble, and M. Liu. Surface street traffic
estimation. In Proceedings of the 5th International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and
Services, 2007.
[61] K. I. W. Zvi Eckstein. Why youths drop out of high
school: The impact of preferences, opportunities, and
abilities. Econometrica, 67(6):1295–1339, 1999.
